Detect covers the gap between an attacker getting in and someone noticing. It starts with logging: what to collect, for how long, and what to do about the sources you cannot afford to keep. On top of that sit detection engineering, the threat intel that says what to look for, and the investigation layer behind an alert.
The hunt library below indexes every hunt from the response playbooks by threat and by tool, so you can start from either one. The queries are not validated against a live tenant yet (the count is stated under the table), so run each in a test tenant and tune it before it pages anyone. Hardening that makes these attacks harder is under Prevent; what to do once one is confirmed is under Respond.
Detect
Detection Playbooks
Know it is happening, early. What to log and for how long, and how to build detection that holds up at scale. Each Prevent package also carries its own detection loop; these cover the shared foundation, the threat intel that tells you what to look for, and the investigation layer behind the alerts.
Log Management
Keep data for the need, not the architecture. Four copies already exist — on-host, cloud native, backup, SIEM. Right-size your SIEM for detection (30–90d), not storage. €50–150/month vs €10K enterprise.
MDR Detection Maturity
Detection at scale, prerequisites, and the five-level maturity ladder. For MDR builders, buyers evaluating vendors, and SOC leaders making the build-vs-partner call. Three-tier model, six detection sources, RFP question set.
Device Code Abuse
M365 / Entra ID runbook for Storm-2372 / EvilTokens / FlowerStorm class attacks. MFA does not stop this — the victim authenticates to a real Microsoft page. One Conditional Access policy closes the door; eight Sentinel hunts find the cases that slip through.
Regional Sector Targeting
Who Gets Hit, by Region — a cross-vendor synthesis of the most-targeted sectors across Benelux, DACH, UK & the Nordics. De-biased across 16+ vendor & CERT sources, with the methodology caveat front and centre: each region is measured with a different ruler.
The Context Layer
Six architectural approaches to the contextual-triage layer — vector memory, entity graph, data lake, bespoke ML, full context graph, hybrid — scored on five dimensions (temporality, provenance, semantics, governance, decision trace). The conclusion is hybrid: no single substrate wins.
Detect — Hunt Library
392 hunts across 7 threats
Every hunt and response action in the incident-response playbooks, indexed by threat and by tool. Each number opens that tool's panel on the playbook. Hunts carry an ATT&CK mapping and a note on what to tune.
| Threat | Hunts | ATT&CK | Defender XDR / Sentinel | CrowdStrike Falcon | SentinelOne | Velociraptor | Splunk | Elastic / Wazuh | AWS | Azure | GCP | Linux / ESXi |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BEC Response | 55 | 17 | 12 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 11 | 11 | – | – | – | – |
| ClickFix Response | 59 | 24 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 10 | – | – | – | – |
| Cloud Incident Response | 36 | 24 | – | – | – | – | – | – | 12 | 13 | 11 | – |
| Device Code Abuse Response | 59 | 10 | 17 | 9 | 9 | 2 | 12 | 10 | – | – | – | – |
| Identity Breach Response | 48 | 21 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 4 | 9 | 9 | – | – | – | – |
| Ransomware Response | 84 | 42 | 16 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 13 | – | – | – | 10 |
| Supply Chain Incident Response | 51 | 19 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 9 | – | – | – | – |
| All threats | 392 | 104 | 74 | 56 | 56 | 35 | 63 | 62 | 12 | 13 | 11 | 10 |
tested date in its YAML for the last run in a real tenant, and none has been filled in yet. Treat each query as unvalidated until it is: run it in a test tenant and tune it before it pages anyone.At a Glance
| Playbook | Threat / Domain | Duration | Investment (200 seats) | Free Controls |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Device Code Abuse | Identity / Detection & Response | 3–5 days | €3,750 – 6,250 | 9 (1 CA + 8 KQL) |
| Log Management | Logging / Detection Infra | 6–8 days | €7,500 – 10,000 | 4 |
| MDR Detection Maturity | Operations / Detection Eng | 3–10 days | €3,750 – 12,500 | n/a (assess) |
| Regional Sector Targeting | Threat Intel / Reference | Reference | n/a (intel) | n/a |